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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Steven B. Boyington,
Case no. 20000312-CA

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Priority No.

Kimi Kajiyama; Larry R. Glen,
Defendants-Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLEES

James W. Palmer
2366 W Jack Circle
West Jordan, UT 84084
801 891-3315

Aaffordable Legal Advocates
Steven C.Russell #6791
Attorney for^si. Afv 9 *-" e<e ^
180 S 300 W Suite 170
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Phone: (801)532-5100
Fax: (801)532-5178

Donald R. Wilson
Wilson and Wilson Attorneys
5620 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
801-531-5100
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Whether Defendants should have been granted an easement by prescription
when the Trial Court found that the use of the easement had been open,
notorious, adverse and continuous for over 20 years.

II.

Whether Defendants should have been granted an easement by necessity when
the Trial court found that there had existed a unity of title, followed by
severance, and that the use of the easement was necessary for accessing
Defendants' property.

III.

Whether Defendants should have been granted a water easement when the Trial
Court found that a new water line is necessary for the reasonable use and
enjoyment of Defendants' respective properties, as well as to protect Plaintiffs
property from water damage.
DETERMINITIVE LAW

Cases:
Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P.2d 533 (Utah App. 1999)
Johnson v. Higlev. 989 P.2d 61 (Utah App. 1999)
Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2d 482 (Ut. App. 1993)
Tschaggeny v. Union Pac. Land Resources Corp, 555 P.2d 277 (Utah 1976)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant has copied into his brief the docket, which suffices, and to which Appellees
chose not to add.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1.

The easement in dispute is described by Exhibit A, herein attached to the Findings of Fact,
and to the Judgment of the Court. R. 167.

2.

The easement actually described by aerial photographs, which runs from West Capitol to
Defendant's properties, and which Plaintiff desires that Defendants be forced to use, is
impassible, and has never been used to gain access to the property. R. 168.

3.

Aerial photographs clearly show that the easement, which has been historically used to
access Defendants' property is from Darwin, south of the large mass of rock, down the
driveway now being used by Defendants, and is the disputed easement described as the shaded
area in Exhibit A. R. 168.

4.

As Plaintiffs property line ends abruptly, access to Defendant Glenn's home is possible
over the easement in dispute. R. 168.

5.

It is impossible to access Defendant's property from west to east along the lower road
because (1) the Kajiyama property extends out onto the road, and (2) the retaining wall makes
the turn so narrow as to be impassible. R. 168.

6.

Aerial photos taken prior to 1979 clearly show that the disputed easement has been in use
for over 20 years, and that the use has open, notorious and continuous. R. 168.

7.

Nancy Pearson and Peggy Pearson both testified that the Kajiyama property was
purchased on a contract sale in 1964, and that the disputed easement has been used ever since
that time. They further testified that the lower road, from West Capitol, was only used as an
exit from the property. R. 168.
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8.

Although PlaintifFKimi Kajiyama did not drive, she did use the disputed easement as a
footpath, and if she did have an automobile, she would have used the easement to gain access
to the property. R. 168-69.

9.

There was clearly a unity of title, and then the property was severed into 3 different
parcels. R. 168-69.

10.

Access to Defendant Glenn's property is a necessity from Darwin, because of the
steepness of the lower road and lack of an easement across Defendant Kajiyama's property.
R. 168-69.

11.

The Kajiyama and Glenn homes are closer to Darwin, than they are to West Capitol,
which makes use of the disputed easement reasonably necessary, as well. R. 168-69.

12.

With respect to Defendant Kajiyama's counterclaim for a water easement across Plaintiffs
property and along the disputed easement, the new water line is necessary for the reasonable
use and enjoyment of Defendants' respective properties, as well as to protect Plaintiffs
property from water damage. R. 168-69.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Trial Court found that the use of the disputed easement over Appellant/Boyington's

property had been open, notorious, adverse and continuous for over 20 years. The Trial Court
then concluded that Appellees, Kajiyama and Glenn, were entitled to a prescriptive easement to
access their property. This conclusion is grounded in well established law, yet Boyington
challenges the Trial Court's legal conclusions for "correctness." While Boyington implies a
challenge to the Trial Court's findings of fact, he does not marshal the evidence, as required by
law, and therefore it is impossible for Kajiyama and Glenn to respond to the "implied" challenge.
3

Boyington's claim of "lack of inquiry notice" was never raised at trial, and even if it had
been, the Trial Court'sfindingthat the use of the easement had been open and notorious for over
20 years would have rebutted the claim.
The Trial Court also found that there had been, at one time, unity of title between the
parties' properties, and, after personally inspecting the property on site, the Trial Court found that
the disputed easement was necessary to gain access to the Kajiyama and Glenn properties. The
Trial Court then concluded that the easement was one of necessity, as well as prescriptive.
Boyington does not seem to challenge this legal conclusion at all.
Finally, the Trial Court found that the water line to the Kajiyama and Glenn properties was
a danger to Boyington's property and that a new line was necessary for the reasonable use and
enjoyment of the Kajiyama and Glenn properties. The Trial Court then concluded that an
easement by necessity, over the access easement already awarded, was in order.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court was correct in concluding that Kajiyama and Glenn were
entitled to a prescriptive easement over Boyington's property.
The Trial Court found that the use of the disputed easement over Boyington's property

had been open, notorious, adverse and continuous for over 20 years. R. 168. The Trial Court
then concluded that Kajiyama and Glenn were entitled to a prescriptive easement to access their
property. R. 170. It is well established law that when one uses another's property for over 20
years in a manner that is open, notorious, adverse and continuous, that a prescriptive easement
has been established. Potter v. Chadaz. 977 P.2d 533 (Utah App. 1999). Boyington claims that
the Trial Court did not jind that the use of the disputed easement had been open notorious and
4

continuous for over twenty years (See Appellant's brief, p. 2, Issue 1; p. 6, Issue 1; p. 34; p. 38).
But this is simply not true, as is obviousfromthe Court's findings. R. 168. Therefore, the Trial
Court's Conclusion of law is correct.
Boyington implies, however, that the Trial Court's findings of fact are in error. Yet
Boyington fails to marshal the evidence, as is required. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d
482 (Ut. App. 1993). Boyington is required to marshal the evidence supporting the Trial Court's
decision, and then he must show that the evidence is deficient. Had Boyington marshaled the
evidence he would have cited to p. 58 of the trial transcript, wherein Peggy Pearson testified that
the Kajiyamas moved into the property in 1964, after her father had purchased the home as part of
a contract sale. He would have cited to p. 59, wherein Ms. Pearson testified that the disputed
easement was always used to gain access to the Kajiyama property. These are just two examples
demonstrating that the Trial Court's finding, that the easement had been used continuously for
over 20 years, was based on solid evidence. As Boyington has failed to marshal any evidence at
all, Appellees will refrain from do it for him. The Trial Court's award of a prescriptive easement,
therefore, should be affirmed.
II.

The Trial Court's conclusion, awarding Defendants an easement by necessity,
was correct, as there had been unity of title, severance and as the easement is
necessary to gain access to the property.
To obtain an easement by necessity, it must be established that there was unity of title,

followed by severance, and the easement must be reasonably necessary to enjoy the estate.
Tschaggenv v. Union Pac. Land Resources Corp. 555 P.2d 277 (Utah 1976). The Trial Court
found that there had been unity of title between the parties' properties, severance of the title, and,
after personally inspecting the property on site, the Trial Court found that the disputed easement
5

was necessary to gain access to the Kajiyama and Glenn properties, as the lower road (which
Boying wanted to force Appellees to use) was impassible. R. 168-69. The Trial Court then
concluded that the easement was one of necessity. R. 169. Boyington does not seem to challenge
this legal conclusion at all. Moreover, Boyington again fails to marshal the evidence, and
Appellees refrain from doing so. Yet the Trial Court Judge actually visited the property and
examined the need for the easement. After personally inspecting the property, the Trial Court
concluded that the entrance to the property from the lower road was impossible, necessitating the
easement from the upper road. R. 151. The Trial Court's legal conclusion awarding Kajiyama
and Glenn an easement by necessity should, therefore, be affirmed.
HI.

The Trial Court's conclusion awarding a water line easement by necessity was
correct as the water line to the Kajiyama and Glenn properties was a danger to
Boyington's property, and was necessary for the reasonable use and enjoyment
of Appellee's property.
As stated above, to obtain an easement by necessity, it must be established that there was

unity of tiled, followed by severance, and the easement must be reasonably necessary to enjoy the
estate. Tschaggeny. supra. Furthermore, it is not necessary to show that at the time of severance
the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible. Id. The Trial Court found unity of title and of
severance. R. 169. Then the Trial Court found that the water line to the Kajiyama and Glenn
properties, which ran underneath Boyington's property, was a danger to Boyington's property,
and that a new line was necessary for the reasonable use and enjoyment of Kaiyama and Glenn's
respective properties. The Trial Court then concluded that an easement by necessity, over the
access easement already awarded, was in order.
Boyington attacks the Trial Court's decision as though it was based upon a prescriptive
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easement theory, rather than one of necessity. See Appellant's brief, p. 8 (citing to UCA §57-3102); p. 28-29; p. 33-38. Boyington complains that the water line was not open and notorious
when Boyington purchased the property. But this is not a requirement for an easement by
necessity. Therefore, the Court's award of the water easement should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
Appellant Boyington cannot attack the Trial Court's legal conclusions, when the findings
of fact are applied to the law. Boyington failed to marshal the evidence so as to attack the Trial
Court's findings, and even if he had, sufficient evidence was presented to support the Court's
findings. Boyington completely ignores the easement by necessity theory and confuses the Trial
Court's reasoning with easement by prescription theory. Therefore, the Trial Court's decision
should be affirmed.

DATED this

Y

day of

J_ ,?> J~

2001.

^^S^^f
Steven C. Russc
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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, 2001,1 did deliver a true
and correct copy of the foregoing to the following persons, postage prepaid:
James W. Palmer
2366 W Jack Circle
West Jordan, UT 84084
801 891-3315
Donald R. Wilson
Wilson and Wilson Attorneys
5620 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
801-531-5100
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAR 2 2 2000
Affordable Legal Advocates, P.C.
G. B r e n t Smith #6657
S t e v e n C. R u s s e l l # 6 7 9 1

/
^TLAKECOUNTY

**

^

Deputy aerie"

Attorney for Defendant Kajiyama
180 South 300 West #170
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Phone # (801) 532-5100
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
Steven B. Boyington,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff,
case no. 970902402PR
v.
Judge Young
Kimi Kajiyama; et. al,
Defendants.
The above entitled matter came on for trial on the 21st day
of January, 2000.

Dcifendants appeared and were represented by

counsel, Steven C. Russell.

Plaintiff appeared and was

represented by counsel, Donald R. Wilson.

After hearing argument

and taking evidence the Court now makes the following findings of
fact and conclusions of law:
1.

The easement in dispute is described by Exhibit A, herein
attached to these Findings of Fact, and to the Judgment of the
Court.

2.

The easement actually described by aerial photographs, which
runs from West Capitol to Defendant's properties, and which
Plaintiff desires that Defendants be forced to use, is
impassible, and has never been used to gain access to the
1

property.
Aerial photographs clearly show that the easement, which has
been historically used to access Defendants1 property is from
Darwin, south of the large mass of rock, down the driveway now
being used by Defendants, and is the disputed easement
described as the shaded area in Exhibit A,.
As Plaintiff's property line ends abruptly, access to
Defendant Glenn's home is possible over the easement in
dispute.
It is impossibles to access Defendant's property from west to
east along the lower road because (1) the Kajiyama property
extends out onto the road, and (2) the retaining wall makes
the turn so narrow as to be impassible.
Aerial photos taken prior to 1979 clearly show that the
disputed easement has been in use for over 20 years, and that
the use has open, notorious and continuous.
Nancy Pearson and Peggy Pearson both testified that the
Kajiyama property was purchased on a contract sale in 1964,
and that the disputed easement has been used ever since that
time.

They further testified that the lower road, from West

Capitol, was only used as an exit from the property.
It is clear that, although Plaintiff Kimi Kajiyama did not
drive, she did use the disputed easement as a foot path, and
2
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The disputed easement is an easement by necessity, as there
severance, and tv~>

was » »nis reasonably necessary t

the enjoyment of: Dr • *
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easement

respective properties.
The disputed easement is an easement by prescription, as the
use of the easement was open, notorious, adverse to
Plaintiff's property interest, and continuously in use for
over 2 0 years.
Defendants claim for a utility easement for the water line
is necessary, as the current line runs directly under
Plaintiff's house, and should it rupture, Plaintiff's property
would likely be damaged, and it is necessary for the use and
enjoyment of Defendants' respective properties.
DATED this

S ^ ^ day of

f/f^U^

U-c
David S. Y
District C
Approved as to Form:

< Donald
£ L •e-*Q
ft-Q j L ,
R. Wilson
Attorney for Plaintiff
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